Investments in space systems are substantial, indivisible and irreversible, characteristics of high-risk investments. Traditional approaches to system design, acquisition, and risk mitigation are derived from a cost-centric mindset, and as such, they incorporate little information about the value of the spacecraft to its stakeholders. These traditional approaches are appropriate in stable environments. However, the current technical, and economic conditions are distinctly uncertain and rapidly changing. Consequently, these traditional approaches have to be revisited and adapted to the current context.
Nomenclature

C ioc
= cost to initial operating capability c ops (i. T) = operations costs expended in the i th T time bin IOC = initial operating capability NPV = net present value of the system r = discount rate T life = design lifetime of system Tx = number of 36 MHz equivalent transponders u(i. T) = revenue generated in the i th T time bin µ = expected net present value of system = net present value standard deviation I. Introduction ommercial satellite operators face a difficult task in managing their investments in space systems. To remain competitive, operators must invest in the needed infrastructure to ensure high quality and continued service to customers. This initial investment is significant, as the cost to initial operating capability (IOC) for satellites often exceed hundreds of millions of dollars. As a result, initial investments in satellites require the operator to accept significant up-front risks. Given the current dominant architecture of space systems, primarily large monolith systems * , investments in communication satellites are substantial, indivisible and irreversible. Furthermore, acquisition times for the satellites often exceed three years from the time the contractual agreement has been finalized with a satellite manufacturer to the delivery of the satellite. This long time lag between the moment a market opportunity or need is identified and the time a system is fielded to satisfy this need increases the operator's exposure to application risk, or the risk associated with failure to realize the value potential of the system due to economic fluctuations, technical advances from competing products, or simply changes in market needs and expectations.
Few solutions exist to date that allow the satellite operator to reduce application risks. Traditionally, systems engineering and program management have focused on reducing lifecycle cost or improving cost-effectiveness to limit investment risk and guide satellite design choices. As a consequence, the design and acquisition of communication satellites is derived from a costcentric (or cost-effectiveness) mindset whose goal is to reduce the lifecycle cost of the satellite, reduce the cost per transponder, or maximize performance for a given/fixed cost. This mindset has led to the design and acquisition of increasingly larger, longer-lived, and more capable satellites, with the premise that the benefits resulting from the economies of scale translate into more valuable satellites. This mindset and premise have recently been challenged and proven flawed under certain conditions [1] . Satellite operators must balance two broad objectives: 1) minimize investment risk, and 2) maximize the net value of the satellite (hereafter calculated as the Net Present Value, or NPV). The value of a system is contingent on the system's technical attributes, the system's environment, and various network externalities; and it is only defined in relation to a given stakeholder. Unlike cost, value is not an intrinsic characteristic of a system, but a "networked" metric that characterizes a system in relation to its environment. As such, it is difficult to determine the impact a design decision will have on the system's net value if decisions are implemented based on cost metrics. It is possible for example that system engineers and program managers may destroy value while trying to mitigate investment risk without the appropriate metrics and decision framework to measure both value and risk.
It is worth noting that traditional cost-centric approaches are appropriate in stable environments with limited uncertainty. It can be argued however that current political, technical, and economic conditions are such that systems' environments are distinctly uncertain and rapidly changing. Thus, the traditional cost-centric approaches to system design and acquisition have to be re-visited and adapted to the current context for better managing various types of uncertainties.
From an investment perspective, a cost-centric mindset is myopic since it focuses on one characteristic of the investment, namely the resources committed (i.e., the cost of the design); it should be self-evident however that any evaluation of an investment is meaningless if restricted to the resources committed without an assessment of its expected return or its value (its value creation potential or its net value). A value-centric framework extends the traditional cost-centric approach by integrating additional information about the system in its environment and its value potential into the down-selection process. In uncertain environments, we argue that decisionmaking with respect to system-level design and acquisition choices, should be value-based, or at a minimum value-informed. This work has two objectives: 1) to introduce the three pillars of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition, and 2) to develop a value-centric framework, and the corresponding analytical tools, for the design and acquisition of commercial communication satellites. The two key metrics for decision-making in our value-centric framework are the spacecraft's expected value and value uncertainty. In contrast to a one-dimensional decision problem, incorporating uncertainty into the decision-making process creates a vectorial optimization problem in which value and value uncertainty are often competing objectives. The result is a portfolio of Pareto-optimal design alternatives with our two proposed key metrics for decision-making, expected value and value uncertainty, as objectives. From this Pareto front, different operators can select different designs based on their particular preferences, for example based on their specific risk tolerance. These issues are further developed herein.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section II introduces the three pillars of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition. Because the analyses are system and industry specific, a commercial communication satellite example is used to illustrate the essence and provide a quantitative application of our proposed value-centric framework. Section III develops the value-centric framework for communication satellites, and outlines the various components of the framework. Details about each component of the framework are also discussed in Section III. Section IV provides an application and a quantitative example of our value-centric framework for commercial communication satellites. Section IV in effect demonstrates the integration of value considerations into the system engineering process, and it illustrates how the value and value uncertainty can be used to guide decision-making for commercial space system design. Section V concludes this work.
II. The Three Pillars of a Value-Centric Approach to System Design and Acquisition
Three pillars support a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition. The first pillar is conceptual in nature and may be stated as follows:
• An engineering system in general (a spacecraft being one example of such a system) is a value delivery artifact. And the value of the system derives from the flow of service the system delivers over its lifetime to one or multiple stakeholders.
The core idea of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition is that value deserves as much effort to quantify as the system's cost, and that value-based metrics make better guides for design optimization and alternatives selection than cost or performance related metrics. But why value "value" of engineering systems? The two remaining pillars address this question. An engineering system is an investment to its stakeholders, and as such, it is expected to provide value to said stakeholders. With this premise in mind, we can now state the second pillar of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition.
• A business or a corporation is a value-delivery entity providing goods and or services to its customers and value to its shareholders. An engineering system within such a corporation is one cog in the company's broader value-delivery machinery. And the imperative to create shareholder value entails that any investment in a technical system (design or acquisition) be guided by its value creation potential or ability to contribute to shareholder value (not only by cost considerations)
The third pillar of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition is related to the concept of metrics in decision-making. Metrics pervade every aspect of our daily lives. The concept of a metric is a fundamental notion in human activities, and no work is actually ever done without an implicit or explicit consideration of a metric or a set of metrics to qualify said activity. A metric can be loosely defined as a standard of measurement. It can be measured directly, or estimated indirectly, qualitatively or quantitatively, or it can be calculated deterministically or probabilistically by combining different measurements [1] . Metrics are essential for decision-making. They allow us to characterize and rank different options, designs, performances, etc. and provide guidance in most of our actions and activities. In engineering design, metrics play a critical role in guiding the selection of the system architecture. System optimization for example hinges on the notion of a metric, or as is more familiar to the optimization community, on an objective function. These metrics or objective functions will guide design and acquisition choices by comparing how well each alternative fares on them. It is therefore essential that the metrics used to guide decision-making be the "right" metrics. The third pillar of a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition is related to the information content of value-related metrics. It is an information-theoretic argument and it can be stated as follows:
• Unlike cost or performance based metrics, which include only endogenous information about the system, value includes the most complete information about the system in its environment (i.e., both endogenous and exogenous information). As such, value allows for better, more transparent, and more relevant trade-offs for the decision-makers in system design and acquisition.
The initial step in developing a value-centric framework is defining the value of an engineering system. A number of financial metrics and methodologies have been adapted and applied to the valuation of engineering systems. The reader is referred to [2] for an extensive review of the concept of value, its historical development, and application to engineering systems. While different measures or proxies of value exist in the economic and financial literature, in this work, we adopt the Net Present Value (NPV) as the measure of the spacecraft value form the satellite operator's perspective. For a discussion of other value measure such as the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), or the Economic Value Added (EVA), the reader is referred to [2] . Value, unlike cost, is not an intrinsic property of the system, but an attribute of the system in relation to its environment (and the characteristics of the environment) and its stakeholder(s). Value is not only dependent on the technical attributes of the system, but also on the stakeholder(s) and in reference to other investments under consideration and in a given environment. Also implicit in this definition of value is the notion of risk, and more specifically of risky cash flow generated by the system (or utility for non-commercial systems). A risk-free bond represents an investment in which returns are certain, that is, the stakeholder or investor is * The argument can be adapted to government acquisition by replacing shareholders with stakeholders and taxpayers guaranteed to receive a certain amount of cash flow from the investment. To forego a risk-free investment in which returns are guaranteed, and instead invest in an engineering system requires the stakeholder to take risks. The stakeholder would consider these risks if the expected return on the investment in the engineering system is adequate compensation for incurring these risks. For an engineering system, an important risk driver is its uncertain and changing environment. Therefore it is important for system engineers and program managers to understand the linkage between the system's technical attributes, the system's environment, and the system's value. This linkage is at the core of any value-centric framework for system design and acquisition.
Because the analyses are system and industry specific, in the following we use a commercial communication satellite as an example to illustrate the essence and provide a quantitative application of our proposed value-centric framework.
III. Value-Centric Framework for Commercial Communication Satellites
Value assessment is intrinsically a multi-disciplinary effort, and a value-centric framework for the design and acquisition of engineering systems is a "hub" for contributions from multiple functions within a company or agency. For example, in the case of a corporation, value assessment of an engineering system should include the traditional contributions from Engineering as well as analyses from Marketing, Sales, and Finance, as will be discussed shortly. Figure 1 illustrates our value-centric framework for commercial communications satellites; shown on Figure 1 are the various modules or analyses required for value assessment, and how these modules relate and feed into each other.
In this section, we discuss each module and motivate the linkages and integration of the different modules in the manner shown in Figure 1 . In Section IV, we provide a numerical example of the application of this value-centric framework. 
A. Spacecraft Design Module
The Design Module generates the set of feasible combinations of technical parameters for the system design. This module contains the purely technical information of the system under consideration, and no cost implications or alternative designs ranking are considered in this module. These technical parameters influence both the value and cost of the system, as will be discussed shortly. There are several design choices that directly impact the system's value. One such technical choice for a communication satellite is the payload size. The payload size may be defined as the number of 36 MHz equivalent transponders providing a certain level of information capacity. As the value of the satellite is derived in part from its information capacity and its loading dynamics [4] , increasing the payload size (i.e., the number of transponders for a communication satellite) impacts both the cost and revenue side of the satellite. These impacts are analyzed respectively in the Cost Module and Revenue Module.
In short, the Design Module provides as output the (feasible combinations of) technical parameters or design vector of the system under consideration, and feeds this output into both the Cost Module and Revenue Module of the value-centric framework, as shown in Figure 1 . 
B. Spacecraft Cost Module
MARKET
The technical choices that "define" a spacecraft also determine its cost. Thus the output of the Design Module directly feeds into the Cost Module as shown in Figure 1 and determines the lifecycle cost and cash outflows of the satellite. The total investment cost to the stakeholder, the satellite operator in our case, is calculated as the lifecycle cost of the satellite. The lifecycle cost consists of two components, the cost to initial operating capability (C ioc ) and the operating cost. The cost to IOC includes the cost of development, production, launch, and insurance of the satellite, that is, all the costs incurred before the satellite is operational on-orbit, whereas the operating costs include all the costs incurred after the spacecraft is on-orbit and its initial capability demonstrated. Figure 2 illustrates the cost breakdown of a satellite. The spacecraft Cost Module can be implemented in different ways, for example through a top-down approach with appropriate cost estimate relationships, or through a detailed bottom-up cost analysis of the spacecraft components (when the data is available), or through a combination of these two approaches. Cost estimate relationships allow for rapid and parametric rough cost analysis, whereas a bottom-up approach provides more accuracy but is time-consuming and does not allow for parametric exploration and trade studies. Which approach is adopted depends on the objectives of the study, the availability of data, and the required precision of the cost estimate. For instance, for our illustrative example in Section IV, we develop a specialized cost model of a spacecraft as a function of its number of transponders (i.e., its payload size) and incorporate typical insurance rate and operating costs.
C. Environment/Market Analysis Module
The previous two modules constitute the traditional systems engineering analysis of a space system. In a value centric framework, these analyses remain important and necessary, but they are not sufficient for enabling value-based or value-informed design and acquisition choices. As stated earlier in Section III, value assessment is intrinsically a multi-disciplinary effort, and a value-centric framework is a "hub" for contributions from multiple functions within a company or agency, in addition to the engineering contributions. In Figure 1 , we highlight three key analyses that Marketing should provide in a value-centric framework. These include an assessment of the potential market size and market demand for the proposed system services (see first pillar of VCF in Section II), the assessment of the competitive intensity in said market (and availability of substitutes), and the identification of the various sources of uncertainty within this market or system environment. These analyses are not exhaustive (for example, technology forecasting and risk of obsolescence can be included in this module) and they can be structured and conducted in different ways, the details of which are not of concern for the scope of our present work.
At a minimum, the Environment or Market Analysis Module should provide as an output a random variable (or a random vector) representing the market share that the system can be expected to capture under various conditions (especially service pricing). The market uncertainty is thus captured in this output by the fact that the market share is assessed as a random variable with a probability density function and a standard deviation. Increasing the standard deviation represents an increasing market uncertainty. This output of the Environment/Market Analysis Module feeds directly into the Revenue module, as shown in Figure 1 .
More generally, the Environment/Market Analysis Module in a value-centric framework should assess the set of key environmental conditions that affect the value of the system, which, recall, derives from the flow of service the system delivers over its lifetime.
D. Revenue Module *
This module takes the inputs from the Design Module and the Environment/Market Analysis Module and estimates the revenues per unit time or revenue profile that the system can generate over its design lifetime from the "rent" or quasi-rent of the services it provides. In the case of a communication satellite, the revenues are contingent on several related factors highlighted in Figure 1 . First among these factors is the transponder lease price, which is determined to a large extent by market structure (duopolistic or (im)perfect competition) and the supply-demand imbalance or overcapacity of on-orbit transponders, if any. The two other factors are the payload size and the load factor of the spacecraft. Details about the loading dynamics of communication satellites can be found in [5] .
The revenue module should be based on a thorough understanding of the market in which the system is to operate. A number of subtleties have to be addressed in this regard, especially if precision is required. For example, transponder lease price and satellite load factor are NOT independent variables. A company's pricing strategy, for example transponder price discounts (over average market price), can spur additional demand and result in an increase of the satellite load factor (satellite operators do provide discounts based on the duration of the contract and on the leased bandwidth or on-orbit capacity). The total impact of a higher load factor but lower transponder lease price has to be carefully evaluated; this can be analyzed through the use of a metric known as the price elasticity of a satellite load factor in a given market [4] . This metric should be of particular importance to the sales and marketing departments of satellite operators. The metric is market-specific, and depends on the supply/demand characteristics as well as the market structure (e.g., monopolistic or competitive market). Satellite operators should be particularly careful in analyzing the impact of transponder price discounts before deciding to pull on this lever. In particular, three broad questions should be explored: 1) Will price discounts spur * In the case of non-commercial systems, this module can be adapted or augmented with a Utility Analysis Module. additional demand or is the market oblivious to small price changes? 2) If the market is sensitive to price changes, will the load factor increase compensate for the loss due to price decrease? and 3) If the market is competitive, will price discounts result in a price war with other operators?
In addition to the above, the revenue module should account for the various uncertainties in its input, in particular the market uncertainty. For example, in this work, we propagate market uncertainty through Monte Carlo simulation, and translate it into revenue uncertainty, which in turn is converted into value uncertainty, as will be discussed next.
E. Value Analysis Module
Having analyzed the cost and the revenue sides of the proposed system for a given environment (the upper and the lower middle blocks in Figure 1 respectively), we are now well poised to conduct a value analysis of the system. The Value Analysis Module integrates inputs from the Cost and Revenue Modules and outputs the net value of a system as a random variable (or random vector). The net value of a system is a function of the revenues per unit time profile of the system or cash inflows (along with this profile's "cone of uncertainty"), and the cash outflows, that is, the costs of acquiring, insuring, launching, and operating the system. The cost and revenue streams can be mapped into a net value of the system by using Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) techniques such as the Net Present Value (NPV). The NPV of an investment, in our case a communication satellite, accounts for the time value of money, including the risk and opportunity cost, by appropriately discounting the associated costs and revenues. For example, let us discretize time into sufficiently small T time bins over which the revenue profile u(t) and the cost to operate the system c ops (t) can be considered constant. We then have: To simplify the indexing, let us assume that these discrete cash flows are accounted for at the beginning of each period, we can then write the NPV of a system as follows:
where r represents a measure of risk, the discount rate, and T life is the design lifetime of the system. NPV discounts all payments to the current period, thereby allowing investors and decision-makers to compare systems over varying time frames and with different cash flow patterns. The NPV is considered a good proxy of value creation for the resources committed to the project or system, and as such, a simple rule follows: projects with negative NPV destroy value and should not be funded. The corollary of this rule is generally accepted (when only expected values are calculated): projects with positive NPV create value and may be funded. A more important use of NPV for our purposes is the benchmarking of different systems and design options. For example, assuming only expected values have been calculated, a system A with a NPV(A) is a better investment than a system B with a NPV(B) if NPV(A) > NPV(B). The NPV calculation is relatively simple if cash flows can be accurately projected and the risk associated with the project is transparent. However, in practice, there is always a degree of uncertainty associated with future cash flows. Thus, deterministic calculations of NPV can convey a false sense of accuracy and may lead to wrong investment decisions. It is therefore essential that any value analysis incorporate the uncertainties associated with the inputs of the value analysis (from the cost and revenue sides in Figure 1 ). Uncertainty in value analysis emerges because of uncertainties in the cost estimates, in demand for the system service, lease price, or market conditions in general. For example, in Section IV, we propagate market uncertainty through Monte Carlo simulation and translate into revenue uncertainty. This revenue uncertainty in turn is converted into value uncertainty through a second stage Monte Carlo simulation using Eq. 1.
In short, the Value Analysis Module provides as an output the NPV of the system under consideration as a random variable as opposed to a single point estimate. The uncertainty associated with this random variable can be measured in different ways; in this work, we use the simple standard deviation statistic as a proxy for NPV uncertainty. For convenience, we provide as the final output of the Value Analysis Module, instead of the probability density function (or probability mass function), the expected value and the standard deviation of our random variable NPV. These two measures, expected NPV (µ) and NPV uncertainty ( ) call for the notion of Pareto optimality and Pareto front, which are discussed next.
F. Output Module
The Output Module presents in the ( , µ) space a set of design alternatives for consideration by the decision-makers. To introduce the purpose of this module, let us first consider the illustrative example shown in Figure 3 . Assume a multitude of design alternatives D i have been analyzed, and for each design, the doublet ( i , µ i ), expected NPV and the NPV uncertainty, has been calculated. Each design can be located in the ( , µ) space as shown in Figure 3 (i.e., each dot in Figure 3 represents a specific spacecraft design in a given environment). Consider for example D 2 versus D 1 . These two design alternatives for a spacecraft have identical expected NPV (µ 1 = µ 2 ), however D 1 has a lower value uncertainty than D 2 ( 1 < 2 ). Similarly, D 3 and D 4 have identical value uncertainty ( 3 = 4 ), however D 3 has a higher expected NPV than D 4 (µ 3 > µ 4 ). We posit that for a given level of value uncertainty, a system with a higher expected NPV is preferable (as is the case with D 3 and D 4 ), and for a given expected NPV, a system with lower value uncertainty (or risk) is preferable (as is the case with D 1 and D 2 ).
These observations introduce the notion of Pareto optimality and its corollary, the Pareto front discussed next. But first, why should value uncertainty matter in a value-centric framework? Significant research has been done over the past several decades on the centrality of uncertainty in decision-making in general, and investment decisions in particular ( [6] , [7] , [8] ). Seasoned decision-makers rarely, if ever, use expected values alone. Since the purpose of a value-centric framework is to support decision-making (in the context engineering system design and acquisition), it is essential that such a framework provide decision-makers not only with the expected NPV of various design alternatives under considerations, but also with a measure of the value uncertainty that these alternatives carry with them. In this work, as mentioned previously, we use the standard deviation of the (random variable) NPV output of the Value Analysis Module as a proxy for a system's value uncertainty. Different decision-makers may have different tolerances for uncertainty. For example, a "conservative" decision-maker may prefer a limited exposure to uncertainty, whereas an "aggressive" decision-maker can tolerate or is willing to take higher investment risk. In both cases, the decision-makers may be willing to trade expected value for value uncertainty, although at a minimum, they should understand the value implications for each design under consideration and be provided with the ( i , µ i ) information. The Output Module in our value-centric framework provides precisely this information, as illustrated in Figure 3 . Now assume that an exhaustive design effort has been conducted and all feasible design alternatives have been analyzed. One distinctive set of design alternatives in the ( , µ) space is particularly interesting: the set that contains all design alternatives for which no higher ("better") µ can be found unless a higher ("worse") value of is sought, and no decrease in can be obtained unless a lower value of µ is sought. This set forms what is referred to as the Pareto optimal designs and its graphic representations in the ( , µ) constitutes the Pareto front. An illustrative Pareto front is shown in Figure 3 by the solid curve.
More formally, we posit that in a value-centric framework the two optimization objectives are to maximize a system's expected NPV (µ) and to minimize its value uncertainty ( ). This is a vectorial or multi-objective optimization problem for which not one optimal solution exists but a set of Pareto optimal design alternatives. As a consequence, the Output Module in our valuecentric framework presents the decision-maker with the Pareto front or the set of Pareto optimal satellite designs (given our two objective functions).
The "optimizer" or techniques for searching the design space for the Pareto optimal solutions need not concern us here (in Section IV, we consider a simple case with a single design variable, the payload size). These are simply represented in Figure 1 by the feedback look from the output of the Value Module to the Design Module.
One aspect of our value-centric framework is worth emphasizing: the framework does not identify one value-optimal design. Instead, a set of Pareto optimal design alternatives are identified and the final down-selection is left to the decision-makers who, as mentioned previously, may have different preferences and tolerance for uncertainty, and as a result, they may set different constraints on the Pareto front. For example, one decision-maker may set a minimum threshold of expected NPV for a system to be considered, which translates into a horizontal line in the ( , µ) space, and only the Pareto optimal design alternatives above this threshold would be considered. A different decision-maker may set another constraint for example in the form of a maximum tolerable value uncertainty, which translates into a vertical line in the ( , µ) space. In this case, only the Pareto optimal design alternatives to the left of this threshold would be considered. A combination of these two constraints can also be conceived. In short, the final design down-selection is stakeholder-dependent; our value-centric framework simply provides the decision-maker with the value implications (expected NPV, and value uncertainty) of design alternatives and it identifies the Pareto optimal designs. The Pareto front helps decision-makers avoid selecting sub-optimal designs, such as the D 4 example discussed previously, since for the same level of value uncertainty, the decision-maker can select a design with a higher expected NPV, namely D 3 .
G. Summary of Framework
The value-centric framework here proposed is information-intensive and multi-disciplinary in nature, incorporating contributions from multiple functions within a company (in particular, from Engineering, Marketing, Sales, and Finance). The objective of our value-centric framework is to help decision-makers make value-based or, at a minimum, value-informed design and acquisition choices of space systems. The framework is based on the three pillars discussed in Section II and it consists of the following six key analysis modules:
1. Design Module, which generates the set of technically feasible designs; 2. Cost Module, which estimates the lifecycle cost and cash outflows of the system; 3. Environment/Market Analysis Module, which assesses the environmental and market conditions for the services of the proposed system (in particular, the competitive intensity in the market, the market size and market demand for the system's services, and their price elasticity); 4. Revenue Module, which given inputs from the Design and Market modules, estimates the revenues per unit time that the system can generate in its proposed environment; 5. Value Analysis Module, which integrates inputs from the Cost and Revenue modules and calculates the net value of a system as a random variable. In particular, the Value Analysis Module outputs the expected NPV and value uncertainty for a multitude of design alternatives; 6. An Output Module, which identifies and presents to the decision-maker(s) a set of Pareto optimal designs for final down-selection (based on the decision-makers preferences)
In the next section, we provide an example illustrating the application and usage of our valuecentric framework for communication satellites.
IV. Application and Illustrative Example
A notional example is provided in this section to illustrate the application and outputs or insights that can be obtained from our value-centric framework for communication satellites. For this example, we are interested in the selection of the payload size for a given market condition.
Varying the payload size has ripple effects throughout the satellite as it drives the size of all the spacecraft subsystems, such as power, thermal, propulsion and attitude control. These technical parameters directly impact the lifecycle cost of the satellite. For the purpose of this illustrative example, we developed a specialized cost model of a communication satellite as a function of its payload size (number of 36 MHz equivalent transponders), and incorporate typical insurance rate and operating costs. First, we developed out parametric model of the cost to IOC based on data from 17 communication satellites with payload size varying from 24 to 92 transponders. The data points and the parametric fit (Eq. 2) are shown in Figure 4 . All costs quoted are in FY04 dollars.
where R 2 is the coefficient of determination. The other assumptions made in our Cost Module are provided in Table 1 . For the Revenue Module, we make the following assumptions: 1) the average transponder lease price is $1.2 million per year, and it is uniformly distributed between $1.1m/year and $1.3m/year; and 2) the satellite reaches its final load factor once on-orbit and maintains it throughout its lifetime (i.e., no satellite loading dynamics are modeled-this is an optimistic assumption). We also assume that the output of the Environment/Market Analysis Module is a lognormal distribution of the market demand that can be captured by the satellite at the lease price specified previously. Finally, a discount rate of 10% is used in the Value Analysis Module. The uncertainties associated with the various inputs are prorogated throughout the framework and translated into value uncertainty using Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation consisted for the example in this section of 5,000 runs providing the probability density function of the system's NPV (along with the expected NPV, µ, and the value uncertainty, ) for these given conditions and assumptions.
A. First case: expected NPV optimization and the traditional "economies of scale" argument in satellite design
It is true that bigger satellites, leveraging economies of scale, offer a smaller cost (to IOC) per transponder, as seen in Figure 5 (derived by rearranging Eq. 2). The cost (to IOC) per transponder of a communication satellite decreases monotonically with the number of transponders (i.e., with the payload size). For example, the two following points on Figure 5 read as follows: a satellite with forty transponders costs approximately $4.8 million per transponder, whereas a larger satellite with sixty transponders costs approximately $3.7 million per transponder. This represents roughly 25% cost advantage per transponder for the larger satellite. This result may have been the guide or justification for designing increasingly larger communications satellites over the past two decades [1] .
Notice that the choice of the payload size in a cost-centric (or cost-effectiveness) mindset is independent of the market conditions, and is always the same: select the largest payload possible since the cost per transponder decreases monotonically with the number of transponder. In short, "bigger is always better" in a cost-centric mindset for communication satellites. Why is this mindset and the resulting design choices flawed?
Consider the following statement by the CEO of Eutelsat: "large empty satellites clearly do not contribute to higher profitability" [1] . If profitability is the key driver for the satellite design and acquisition in the first place, then cost related metrics (such as cost per transponder) are poor proxies for profitability in a competitive or demand-constraint market. Clearly, the environment or the market for which the system is intended has to be accounted for in designing the system and selecting its characteristics. But how can this environment be accounted for in the design process? The answer is precisely what our value-centric framework provides.
For example, consider the case where the Marketing Analysis Module provides us with the information that the market demand for on-orbit capacity that can be captured is lognormally distributed, with an expected value of 40 transponders and a 30% uncertainty (standard deviation). Given the previous assumptions, we can run the analysis in our value-centric framework. In this subsection, we calculate one single output, the expected NPV (no considerations of value uncertainty), and compare it with the traditional "economies of scale" argument in satellite design. The result is shown in Figure 6 . The expected NPV analysis clearly identifies an optimal * payload size for a given market. Figure 6 shows how the expected NPV of the satellite varies with the payload size. Several observations can be made:
1. There exists a minimum payload size below which the satellite will "destroy" value, i.e., it will have a negative NPV, and should not be further considered (see discussion in III-E). A negative NPV reflects the fact that the Present Value of the cash outflows, that is the Present Value of the costs of acquiring, insuring, launching, and operating the satellite, are not compensated for by the Present Value of the revenues that the system would generate in its intended market. For our example and given our assumptions, this minimum payload size is 28 transponders. 2. The expected NPV increases at first with the payload size above the minimum threshold. This occurs as the payload capacity can still be wholly absorbed by the market demand, and the marginal cost of payload increase remains smaller than the incremental Present Value of revenues generated by the additional transponders. 3. An optimal payload size exists which maximizes the expected NPV of the satellite for a given market. For our example and given our assumptions, this optimal payload size is 43 transponders, with an expected NPV of roughly $80 million. This constitutes approximately 25% return on investment in the system for the satellite operator. 4. In a cost-centric (or cost-effectiveness) mindset, the decision-maker would always push for a larger payload given the behavior of the cost per transponder curve (Fig. 5 ) regardless of market conditions. However, the expected NPV drops as the number of transponders increases beyond the optimal payload size for a given market, as shown * Which maximizes expected NPV.
in Figure 6 . For example, if a payload of 60 transponders were selected for the market conditions in our example, the resulting expected NPV of the satellite would be roughly $60 million. This constitutes approximately 17% return on investment in the system for the satellite operator. From an investment perspective, both satellite designs (with 43 and 60 transponders) generate a positive NPV and may be funded, however, given the market conditions, the larger satellite would forfeit (not capture) a sizeable financial value compared with the smaller value-optimized satellite. As quoted previously from the CEO of Eutelsat, more transponders in "large [not fully loaded] satellites clearly do not contribute to higher profitability", nor do these large satellites provide the best return on investment for the satellite operators and their shareholders. In other words, the decision to select a larger payload because of its smaller cost per transponder does not correspond to or result in an optimal value (expected NPV) of the system.
The distinction between a cost-centric and value-centric approach to system design in general, and satellite design in particular, is not merely a conceptual exercise; different design choices may result from the adoption of one or the other, and as a consequence different returns on investment, as shown in our example. It is worth emphasizing however that our value-centric framework does not promote smaller or larger satellites: different market conditions will drive different design choices, and the present work provides a systematic way for incorporating market information in the down-selection process (larger satellites may be the value-optimal solutions for some market conditions, for example in supply-constrained markets).
The discussion in this subsection was confined to expected NPV with no consideration of value uncertainty, which as discussed in III-E, results from the propagation of the uncertainties in the inputs to the Value Analysis Module, especially the market uncertainty. How do we account for market uncertainty, and what implication does it bear on the choice of the payload size? This topic is discussed and illustrated in the next subsection.
B. Second case: beyond expected NPV optimization, expected value, value uncertainty, and Pareto optimality for satellite design As mentioned previously, seasoned decision-makers rarely if ever base their choices on expected values alone. Uncertainty is central in decision-making in general, and investment decisions in particular. Given the assumptions stated previously on transponder lease price (uniformly distributed between $1.1m/year and $1.3m/year) and the market demand for on-orbit capacity that can be captured by the system (lognormally distributed, with an expected value of 40 transponders and a 30% uncertainty), we run a Monte Carlo simulation and obtain the probability density function (or probability mass function) of our random variable of interest, the NPV of the satellite. The results are shown in Figures 7a and 7b for satellites with 30 transponders and 50 transponders respectively.
The red line in each graph indicates the mean value of the satellite's NPV. For example, the satellite with 30 transponders (Figure 7a ) has an expected NPV around $14 million; Similarly, the satellite with 50 transponders (Figure 7b ) has an expected NPV around $68 million. This information is also found in Figure 6 for a whole range of payload sizes. In addition to the expected NPV, Figures 7a and 7b also shows the NPV dispersion for the two satellites. For example, given our market conditions, the value dispersion associated with the smaller payload satellite is significantly smaller than the value dispersion of the larger one. The expected value and standard deviation of the NPV for the two satellites are provided in Table 2 . If market conditions unfold favorably, the larger satellite can capture most (or the whole) of the market, and thus it has a higher expected NPV than the smaller satellite. However, should market conditions unfold unfavorably (recall we modeled market conditions with a lognormal probability density function), the larger satellite represents a higher investment risk than the smaller satellite.
When Table 2 is extended to a whole range of payload sizes, we map the results to the ( , µ) space and obtain Figure 8 . Unlike the situation in IV-A where a single value-optimal payload size was identified by maximizing the satellite's expected NPV, in this case, we have a set of Pareto optimal design alternatives in the ( , µ) space. The important aspect of these results (Figure 8 ) is that they clearly identify the trade-offs between expected value and value uncertainty of each design alternative to the decision-maker. The selection of the payload size can now be made given the particular preferences and constraints of the decision-maker (as discussed in II-F). The design choice can now be said to be value-based or at least valueinformed. 
V. Conclusion
In this work, we challenged the traditional cost-centric or cost-effectiveness approach to satellite design, and demonstrated that it is flawed under certain environment conditions. We developed in its stead a value-centric framework and proposed that in uncertain environments, decision-making with respect to system-level design and acquisition choices should be valuebased or, at a minimum, value-informed.
We first introduced the three conceptual pillars that support a value-centric approach to system design and acquisition. We then developed a special case of a value-centric framework, analytical tools, and illustrative numerical example for communication satellites. We showed that value assessment is intrinsically a multi-disciplinary effort and a value-centric framework is a "hub" for contributions from multiple functions within a company, including Engineering Marketing, Sales, and Finance. We proposed that the two key metrics for decision-making in a value-centric framework are the system's expected value (NPV) and its value uncertainty. Value uncertainty emerges because of uncertainties in the cost estimates, in demand for the system services, their lease price, and market conditions in general. In this work, we propagated the uncertainties in the inputs to the Value Analysis Module using Monte Carlo simulation and identified a set of Pareto-optimal design alternatives with our two proposed key metrics for decision-making as objectives: expected NPV and value uncertainty.
Unlike cost or performance based metrics, which include only endogenous information about the system, value includes the most complete information about the system in its environment (i.e., both endogenous and exogenous information). As such, value allows for better, more transparent, and more relevant trade-offs for the decision-makers in system design and acquisition. By using expected value and value uncertainty as decision metrics in the downselection process, system engineers and program managers will draw more information about the system in its (uncertain) environment, and in making value-based design and acquisition choices, they ultimately make more informed and better choices.
The framework presented here offers rich possibilities for future work. For example, the three following research directions would be particularly useful: 1) expanding the satellite design trade space to include multiple technical parameters other than the payload size here analyzed, 2) accounting for obsolescence effects, and 3) adapting this value-centric framework to systems with "unpriced values", that is, systems whose services are not "rented" such as military or science satellites.
